to correct themselves in mid-utterance (whereas other participants usually wait until next-turn before other-correcting), and 2) adult speakers often initiate a correction sequence which allows the speaker of an utterance containing a trouble-source to selfcorrect, i.e., in adult conversation, they find that "other-initiations ovenvhelmingly result in self-repair" (376), as in the following example (1977:377) Ken:
'E likes that waider over there.
AI:
Ken: Waitress, sorry.
In the above example, speaker two (Al) has initiated a repair sequence by identiffing a trouble source, but has left the repair to speaker one.
Thus, Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks find other-correction to occur infrequently in adult conversation, and when it does occur, they stress that it is often specially marked, or "modulated." Modulation of other-correction often takes the form of questioning modality, and may be accompanied by hedges or qualifiers, pauses, and other markers of uncertainty which together index the other-correction as a guess or "try" at understanding the prior utterance containing the trouble-source, as in the following example (1977: 378) , in which "y'mean" accompanied by questioning intonation seryes to modulate the other-correction:
Lori:
But y'know single beds'r awfully thin tuh sleep on. Sam:
What? L.ori:
Single beds. ll They'reSam: Lori:
They're awfully narrow ll yeah.
Although non-modulated other-correction may be found, it almost always occurs in third-turn-position, i.e., as an invited response to a prior modulated other-correction, as in the following:
Ben:
Lissena pigeons.
(.7) Bill:
Quail, I think. Ben:
Oh veh?
(1.5i
In contrast to the above findings3 for adult interaction, a brief examination of children's classroom interaction shows immediately that the data contains many examples of unmodulated other-correction, and furthermore, that it often occurs in second-turn-position, being, in other words, "uninvited." One consequence of this interactional difference appears to be a predilection for dispute, or argument, unless the speaker in such cases is willing to accept an interlocutor's correction. However, since the interlocutor's usurping of the opportunity for self-repair also seems to imply a lack of competence on the previous speaker's part (Goodwin & Goodwin L987) , sihe may not always be willing to accept this implication, and (as the data often show) might prefer to argue the point.
In an analysis of children's arguing, Goodwin & Goodwin suggest that in children's interaction, opposition is not dispreferred, and in fact, may be at least partially accomplished through other-correction (with or without location of a trouble iource), which does not provide a space for speaker to self-repair. For example, opposition may be signalled through the use of polar expressions such as "no," "nuh-uh," .i.., o. through repetition of the trouble source marked by contrastive accent (i.e. marked pitch o. uoiu-"), or intonation. As Goodwin & Goodwin point out, the use of falling or rising-falling intonation (as opposed to rising) may result in different sequential organization of the interaction. For example, rising intonation may be used to modulate the location of a trouble source, hence inviting self-repair, whereas falling or rising-falling intonation may more often be used to signal opposition, "not only focus[ing] attention on the trouble as trouble, but also call[ing] into question _th_e .orp'.t.n.e of the party who produced such an object" (Goodwin & Goodwin 1987: 208) . Ottrer-correction often follows such opposal-initiating strategies in the form of puriiul repetition of the prior utterance, but with a new item substituted for the trouble iourr.. Ai the following example of interaction from a first-grade classroom (Maynard 1986) shows, all of the above strategies for opposition involving other-correction may occur together, and may result in the original speaker's unwillingness to accept the implication conveyed by such strategies, i. We're older than you Bonnie. And WE know. ... We KNOW it was erase-eraser.
This last example provides a good illustration of Goodwin & Goodwin's point that opposition and unmodulated repair of a trouble source implicitly index u sian." on speaker B's part (or, in the above case, on the rest of the group's part) toward not only speaker A's proposition, but toward speaker A's communicative-competence, as well. In this paper, I will suggest that the predilection for other-correction, and even dispute, is functional in children's interaction because it allows them to explore this indexicalization of stance (Ochs & Schieffelin 1989) , in more than one way. First of all, it encourages them to develop a stance toward prior talk itself, which is of crucial importance for children as it allows them to compare and negotiate their intuitions about the language they are still actively acquiring. When dispute occurs, as when speaker A refuses to accept speaker B's correction, children are pushed to adopt an epistemological stance toward the prior talk. Other-correction also pushes childrin to explore how to index epistemological and affective stance toward each other, as well as toward implied meta-messages such as that identified by Goodwin & Goodwin (1987) , i.e., of incompetence.
Data
The data from which I drew my examples consist of six videotaped and audiotaped sequences of approximately 45 minutes eacha. The interaction occurring in these tapes is of children working cooperatively on various reading activities, i.e., talking togetirer about various topics related to the activity. These data were collected as pariof in ongoing research project on cooperative education at the University of California Santa a The data used in this study were generated as part of an ongoing research project into children's cooperative interaction. I am indebted to RichardDuran, GeneLrner, and John Gumperz for allowing me to use this data for the purposes of this paper.
B:
Barbara. Five of these tapes were collected in monolingual English-speaking classrooms; four of these were fourth-grade and one was third-grade. One tape came from a bilingual third-grade classroom, in which the children on the tape are native speakers of Spanish working in English.
One of the six tapes used I had already transcribed in its entirety, so that I was able to read the transcript in order to locate examples of other-correction or location of trouble sources; however I also had access to the original audio and videotape in order to check intonation contours. The other five I listened to in order to locate relevant examples, which I then transcribed. The transcription system used was that of Du Bois et al. 1993 , for transcribing intonation units, or units of speech each with their own intonation contour.
2. Methodology I looked for examples of either 1) other-correction or 2) other-initiation of repair. As discussed above, since I was looking only for examples of correction of prior talk, rather than requests for clarification, specific information, etc., I did not look at troublelocating utterances which took the form of WH-questions, etc., or general requests for repetition due to mishearing such as "hmm?." I looked only for examples of otherinitiation which consisted of partial or complete repetition of a previous utterance (regardless of intonation, which I considered later).
In identiffing examples of other-correction, I counted polar opposal followed immediately by other-correction as one "unit" of other-correction, (whether or not they occurred in separate intonation units), as polar opposition alone hardly makes clear, or locates, what specifically the trouble is, as repetition or substitution do.
Results and Discussion
In children's interaction, other-initiation does not appear to be a mechanism which leads to a skewing toward self-repair. I found five instances of other-initiation of repair. Of these, only one was followed by self-repair. Three were followed by other-correction, and one was not followed by any clear correction at all, due to what appear to be cognitive limitations, i.e., none of the three children involved was sure what the correct linguistic form actually was. Interestingly, the one example of self-repair followed otherinitiation with rising-falling intonation (or contrastive stress on the one word which the intonation unit consisted of), rather than rising intonation, as might be expected. The four instances of other-initiation all had rising intonation, yet were followed by either other-correction or no correction at all. To summarrze my findings concerning otherinitiation, I found very few examples (five), but of these few, only one led to self-repair.
I found nine examples of interaction containing other-correction, some of which contained multiple instances of other-correction, by one or more other participants. In these nine examples of interaction, there were 17 total instances of other-correction. Of these 17, none were modulated, in the sense of being presented with question modality or as indexing uncertainty. In other words, where other-correction occurred, it was not "specially marked," at least not in the way that Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks find for adults. No tag questions or hedges occurred, nor did any have rising intonation; rather, 15 instances had falling intonation, one had rising-falling intonation, and one had so much intensity/stress (transcribed with an exclamation mark) that I really couldn't discern the direction of the pitch contour (cf. fig.1 The 17 instances of other-correction also occurred in various positions sequential to the turn containing the trouble-source (i.e., even multiple times, across several turns), which also differs from adult interaction. Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks find othercorrection in adult conversation to be restricted to a "local sequential environment, e.g.r just after modulated other-corrections and understanding checks" (380). Thus the above two observations concerning: 1) lack of modulation, and 2) relative freedom of sequential position, appear to have consequences for the overall structure of othercorrection in children's classroom interaction: it does not appear to be dispreferred. The data are presented below: 3.1. Othe r-initiation follow e d by self-re pair :
( 1 , fhe above example is particularly interesting because so much is accomplished '' through prosodic cues. What the speakers' illocutionary intent is in many of these ' utterances is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to discern, except for line L5, where
. it is fairly clear that her intent is to emphasize the final past-t.ni" morpheme, or to I focus the attention of the group on a specific trouble-source. Only the first repetition in line two appears to be a clear instance of other-initiation, since subsequent repetitions appear to be ambiguous as to whether they are initiations of self-or othercorrection. Rather, these repetitions may better be characterrzed as requests for confirmation (Garvey 7977) of the correctness of the alternate forms being presented. Thus, this example diff'ers from the others presented here in that uncertainty ri indexed, and other-correction never clearly occurs. This interpretation seems to be reflected in the ensuing discourse, as L and E offer confirmation, although for both forms of the utterance, in lines 10, 13 and 16. The children cannot seem to make up their minds which form is correct. and in the end thev all write down "alwavsed." JJ 3.3" Other-correction
In the following example, there are nine instances of other-correction, although the trouble source appears to shift from interpretation of events in the "real world" to a focus on linguistic form, or perhaps, in interactional terms, from "disagreement" to "other-correction"; note however, that these rwo foci appear to be integrally related, if not impossible to separate. Here again, as in the above example, an interactional strategy is used repetitively to focus the attention of the group on a specific troublesource, which is repaired several times. as "yes it is!"--"no it's not!"), but that the interactants are trying to formulate the ' "correct" way of expressing what they mean to say (i.e., "a week from tomorrow," which ' none of them quite manages), and also, that at the end of the example (1.25-26), two , of them (Jo uni lu; acknowledge the correction, providing a "sense of closure" to the . entire interaction, which thereby provides a contrast with children's disagreement (in , the technical sense of the term as used in the conversation analysis literature), in which , "an outcome is much less clear-cut" (Goodwin 1982 (Goodwin , 1983 . '
In the following example, J other-corrects S without any other-initiation which , right have allowed S to self-repair. S accepts this correction quite peaceably:
, t+l In the next example, speaker B interjects other-correction in the middle of speaker A's turn. Although this is obviously related to the fact that A has been assigned J lengthy passage to read, it is worth pointing out that here is a specific environment where other-correction is not withheld until completion of the turn containing a trouble source" In ex. 8, disagreement appears to precede the other-correction in l. 9-10, where T qualifies her disagreement by specifically stating what she disagrees with in L's construction: "Genny" didn't say that "she didn't want to live with these people anymore." Thus, she is correcting L's understanding of the word "react," which-in this case, T thinksT indexes reported speech. In the following three examples, note the reaction of the children who are being corrected; they all say "I know," which appears to be in response to the implied metamessage of incompetence on their part: (e) The last three examples provide illustrations of Goodwin & Goodwin's polnt that opposition and unmodulated other-correction implicitly index a stance on speaker B's part (or, as in some cases, on the part of several other participants) toward not only speaker A's proposition, but toward speaker A's communicative competence, as well. A direct consequence of this implication appears to be that speaker A refuses to accept, or acknowledge as true, the correction. As the last three examples above show, one common response to other-correction is the reply "I know" on speaker A's part. which often seems somewhat incongruous in terms of propositional content, but makes more sense as a reply to an implication of incompetence. For instance, in the last example above, L and V are trying to discover how to spell "talk," not "tell,"; L seems to be confused here, insisting on the word "tell," with past tense morphology. V knows very well that L is confused; she has just pointed this fact out to L by pointing to the word "talk" on the board, and by cclrrecting her utterance in 1.2, so when V says "l kno=:w," she appears to be doing more than simply agreeing with L's propositional content: rather, the reply "l know" may be better understood as a response to the implied meta-message behind L's opposal, i.e., that V is the one who is mistaken or confused.
The desire to avoid this implication may be part of the underlying motivation lor the adult preference toward allowing self-repair. For example, one can imagine unmodulated other-correction occurring fairly easily between adults who are very close. or less concerned about the "face-losing" implication of such repair, I.e., spouses, or. as rn the following examplen, hetween adult siblings:
That's really heart-rendering.
rending, Sarah, other-correction you don't <QUO render QUO> your heart. S:
What'l are you sure? rending? no it's not, I always say <QUO heart-rendering QUO>. M:
ves. I'm sure. to render means to <@ boil the fat out of something @t. S: <Cg I don't believe you @>! I'm gonna look it up in the dictionary.
In the above example, S and M are both very confident of their intuition as native speakers; the dispute ends with S's statement that she is going to look up the correct form in the dictionary, the ultimate objective source of linguistic "correctness." Yet the disagreement remains at a relatively objective (i.e., emotionally neutral) level; although S says "I don't believe you," she doesn't say "you're wroflg," and neither does M.
Another way of thinking about why children seem to be predisposed to engage in other-correction, ofien leading to "aggravated correction" or dispute (Goodwin & Goodwin 1987) , is in terms of the metalinguistic tools which they have at their disposal for accomplishing such social activities as indexing certainty of linguistic knowledge. As Ochs & Schietfelin (1990) have stated, epistemological, or evidential indexing or stance often overlaps with affective indexing or stance. Such linguistic tools as intonation, modality, and polar (yes/no) interjections are heavily laden with affect (Besnier 199I; Ochs & Schiefi'elin 1990) , thus they may often signal speakers' affective as well as epistemological stance toward the prior utterance. How an interlocutor reacts to the identification of a trouble source in their speech may often depend on his/her interpretation of speaker B's stance (Schegloff 1991) ; not only may the interlocutor interpret it as negative or positive, but s/he may also interpret it as directed toward him/her personally, not only towards his/her prior utterance. All of these considerations in human interaction can be very delicate; it seems to me that the line between affective and epistemological stance may often be impossible to draw. It may also be that these two types of stance are linked such that any challenge of one's epistemological stance invokes a particular (i.e., defensive) affective stancelo. I would like to suggest that perhaps the reason why other-correction in children's interaction often appears as aggravated correction or dispute is that they have not quite learned how to separate (as superficial as this separation may be) affective and epistemological stance. Although adults may not always make this separation either, we are certainly capable of making the distinction when necessary, as when we begin statements with a "disclaimer of affective intent" such as "don't take this personally" or "no offense, 10 Thir example is reconstructed from memory, but happened a week before this writing, between my sister and myself, over the phone.
S: M:
but.." etc. Likewise adults may also index their level of epistemological certainty with epistemic phrases (Thompson & Mulac 1991) like "I think," or "I guess." It seems to me that much of the modulation which Schegloft, Jefferson & Sacks (I974) observe in adult negotiation of repair may be designed to achieve exactly this separation of types of stance, or rather to eftectively disguise the "trouble-locator's" affective stance" As Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks point out, the linguistic devices employed to modulate other-correction, such as hedges, questioning modality, pauses, hesitations, passive constructions, tag questions, etc., all serve to subdue an implication of direct disagreement, as well as to (perhaps falsely) index uncertainty on the trouble-locator's part. Children are rarely guilty of this kind of disingenuity"
There are several possible hypotheses as to why children do not share the adult interactional preference (in the technical sense described above) for allowing selfrepair. One may be that they have not yet noticed or acquired it as a purely social norm; another might be that they have not yet acquired the linguistic competence (i.e., passive constructions, hedges, different types of modality, etc.) to perform otherinitiation, thereby allowing self-repair (this seems the most unlikely, horvever, since children have definitely acquired question modality and unstressed intonation!). Another possibility is that the social norms for interaction between children are simply different. In their paper on the preference for self-repair, Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks discuss Roger Brown's suggestion that other-correction is much more common in adultchild interaction. Given this observation, it does not seem too strange to suggest that this norm extends to children's interaction with each other. Obviously, more research and analysis is needed to say more about the relations between age, participation structure, and social norms tor repair. However, I would like to suggest that, given that children do not appear to share the adult preference for self-repair, other-correction may serve a function in children's interaction. Specifically, I am suggesting that othercorrection of prior talk may serye as a mechanism for children to develop, or internalize, linguistic knowledge as well as an epistemological stance toward what linguistic forms may be acceptable in their speech community. As exaniple two above shows, children may be capable of locating a trouble source before they are able to repair it themselves, or even to unambiguously identi$ exactly which element of the prior talk they perceive as a trouble source (i.e.. the "-ed" on the end of alwaysed); this seems to be an indication of just how ready and willing children are to locate trouble sources in language around them, or at least, in their peers'language, and to negotiate them publicly.
Furthermore, as several sociolinguists ([.abov 1963; Wald 1981) have suggested, children do not speak exactly like their parents, but rather, must actively construct the speech pattern of their own peer group and generation. Public negotiation of linguistic form and meaning would seem to be a central mechanism for such linguistic change. fu I have tried to show, children may be capable of locating a trouble source without actually being able to repair it; in Vygotskian terms, the form or meaning they are focusing on may be within their zone of proximal development, but not yet "fossilized." This state of aftairs is very different from adult interaction, where, as Schegloff (1991) observes, locating a trouble source automatically indexes a speaker's stance toward the prior talk by "revealing some understanding of that prior talk." For children, this "understanding" may be much less developed. I would suggest that one of the functions of other-correction of language among children is that it encourages them to develop a "group stance" toward prior talk, or linguistic form and meaning. Other-correction may thus be described as a dialectic process, in which linguistic form and meaning within children's speech communities may be publicly evaluated as well as negotiated.
Secondly, especially when it results in dispute, other-correction may also be described as a mechanism for learning how to index stance, not only towards each other, but towards the implications of meta-messages resulting from the way the content of a message is presented. As linguistic anthropologists have pointed out (Keenan 1974; Kochman 1981; Maltz & Borker 1982) ,, the pragmatic/social norms for the indexicalization of epistemological vs. affective stance (Ochs & Schieffelin 1990) may differ cross-culturally. Thus, social norms for interaction such as repair of prior talk are hardly universal, and must be learned. Such differences in interactional strategies thus exemplify what Hymes (1974) calls "sociolinguistic relativity," i.e., the Whorfian principle of linguistic relativity at the level of language use, rather than linguistic code. Through social practice and interaction with their peers as well as adults, children are given the opportunity to explore and learn about the norms for social interaction in their own communitv.
Conclusion
To summarize,,l have tried to show that the interactional norms for handling repair of prior talk between children is dit'ferent from the adult preference for self-repair, in that unmodulated other-correction is not dispreferred. I have discussed some implications of this differential norm, as well as some possible functions. In terms of sequential implicature, direct other-correction may lead to dispute, as a consequence of the implied meta-message that the first speaker lacks communicative competence (Goodwin & Goodwin 1987) . I further related this observation to a discussion of the indexicaiization of stance (Ochs & Schieffelin 1990) , which may be either affective or epistemological, or both. I suggested that the pref'erred status of self-repair in adultinteraction may be seen as a mechanism for disguising or subordinating affective stance, perhaps in order to avoid the possibility of dispute. I further suggested that the differential norm for repair in children's interaction, which appears to be related to a predilection for dispute, may be functional, in that it provides an opportunity for public negotiation of the "correctness" of prior talk, allowing children to develop a group stance toward linguistic form and meaning. Finally, I suggested that unmodulated othercorrection may also function to encourage children to explore their socio-cultural norms for indexing stance (both atfective and/or epistemological), not only towards language, but towards each other, as well as towards the implications of stances taken by others, or meta-messages such as the implication of lack of competence identified by Goodwin & Goodwin (1987 
